[Article] Strained relations over ancient ruins wrecking lives.

14/10/2010 | Bangkok Post | Barbara Woolsey

The battles have been waged on international platforms and behind closed cabinet doors, but this is more than just politics - this is playing with people's lives.
The Thai-Cambodia border dispute over the Preah Vihear temple is over a century long and for many of the locals, conflict is all they have ever known.
Resting atop a cliff over 1,500 feet above sea level, the ancient place of worship presents a stunning view of extraordinary ruins and endless jungle.
However, its natural beauty and spiritual resonance has been stripped in the ensuing violence undertaken in the name of sovereignty.
Its engimatic beauty is irrelevant. Preah Vihear is a war zone.
Preah Vihear was awarded to Cambodia by the International Court of Justice in 1962, but the clash didn't stop there. When the temple was declared a Unesco World Heritage Site in 2008, the tension between Thailand and its neighbour came to a head - and is arguably now worse than ever.
For many Thais, the Preah Vihear issue is one of security and nationalism. In a recent poll by the National Institute of Development Administration (Nida), nearly 70% of Thai citizens agreed that the government should push Cambodians out of the overlapping area.
But for locals living in the 13 villages across the Thai-Cambodia border, the temple is much more than a symbol of patriotism - it is a constant reminder of economic hardship.
Despite history, "the relationship between Thais and Cambodians used to be like brothers and sisters", said Visit Duangkeaw, a life-long resident of Si Sa Ket province.
"It was very convenient before. We were able to do business on the other side of the border. We could walk freely, that's how easy it was."

Most religious sites invite quiet contemplation, but this border temple of Preah Vihear excites only intemperate passion.

When the temple was declared a World Heritage Site, everything changed.
PAD protests against Unesco's decision, border skirmishes and the resulting military presence threw locals for a loop. They expected the temple to become a popular tourist destination, not target practice.
"People used to be able to exchange information with each other, instead of the military standing on either side of the border," said Mr Visit. "Now, I can see the other person, but we can't even contact each other."
In June, access to the temple from Thailand was blocked off completely. The temple is still reachable through a packed laterite road from Siem Reap, passing directly through a Cambodian military base.
For many tourists, Preah Vihear is not worth the travel or the risk.
"I invested a lot of money in my business [when it became a World Heritage Site] and my business has failed," said merchant Chit Pranpop from Pomsarol village in Si Sa Ket.
Ms Chit borrowed money to expand her small restaurant along the Thai gate to Preah Vihear, which has since closed. She is deeply in debt, working at a temporary work agency as a server.
"[My business failed] only because I can no longer contact the other side where people used to buy my stuff," said Ms Chit. "I would like for that old channel to still exist. That was the only way that I could find money for as long as I can remember."
-

[... Read the full article here ...]

[Article] Stones of contention.

28 September 2010 | Southeast Asia Globe | Charlie Lancaster

For decades, Preah Vihear has been witness to a war of words and sporadic fights between Cambodian and Thai troops over territorial claims.
The 11th century cultural tourist site lies at the heart of a border dispute that harks back 100 years and was re-ignited in 1954 when Thai forces occupied the temple following French withdrawal from Cambodia. Cambodia's successful bid to have the temple listed as a Unesco World Heritage site in July 2008 sparked the recent series of cross-border spats and political posturing. Since then, nationalists, media sensationalists and politicians pursuing private agendas have commandeered the temple. All the while, tourists and cultural enthusiasts are left waiting in the wings for the curtain to finally close on the drama, so they can visit this World Heritage site in peace.
It is in no one's interest for the issue to spiral out of control, for the disputed land surrounding the temple to turn into a 'zone of death', as Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, once threatened or for Thailand to employ military force to resolve the issue, as The Nation quoted Thai Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva as saying in August. Dialogue, with or without Asean as a mediating body, is the best hope for a peaceful solution. But why is this conflict dragging on? Who, or what, is adding fuel to the fire?

The 1907 map, on which the 1962 ICJ ruling was based, placed the temple within Cambodia.

The watershed affair
The 900-year-old temple was built at the height of the Khmer empire. In 1904, Siam and French authorities ruling Cambodia formed a joint commission to demarcate their mutual border along the watershed line of the Dangrek mountain range, which would have placed nearly all of Preah Vihear temple on Thailand's side. However, when France drew up a topographic map to identify the border's location in 1907, the line deviated from the watershed in the Preah Vihear area, placing the entire temple within Cambodia. Crucially, Thailand did not immediately contest this map, on which the 1962 International Court of Justice ruling concluded the temple was "situated in territory under the Sovereignty of Cambodia" was based.

[...Read the full article here...]

[Rapport] Bridging Thailand’s Deep Divide.

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP - NEW REPORT
Bridging Thailand’s Deep Divide

Bangkok/Brussels, 5 July 2010 : The Thai government should immediately lift the state of emergency to create conditions for national reconciliation that would allow the building of a new political consensus and the holding of peaceful elections if the country is to return to stability.

Bridging Thailand’s Deep Divide,* the latest report from the International Crisis Group, says the protracted tussle between the royalist establishment and those allied with ousted Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra has left the country deeply polarised. In April and May it sparked the most violent political confrontations in decades, killing at least 90 people, injuring nearly 2,000 and inflicting deep wounds on the national psyche. Shortly before authorising a violent crackdown on anti-government protestors by the army, the establishment-backed government of Abhisit Vejjajiva unilaterally offered to opposition groups a “roadmap” to national reconciliation. It now persists with this plan despite having created an atmosphere of repression where basic rights of the pro-Thaksin “Red Shirt” movement are denied by emergency laws.

[ ... Read the full article here ]

To support our work in Asia and around the world, please click here. 
*Read the full Crisis Group report on our website: www.crisisgroup.org
Andrew Stroehlein (Brussels) +32 (0) 2 541 1635
Kimberly Abbott (Washington) +1 202 785 1602
To contact Crisis Group media please click here

[Article] En Thaïlande, "le premier problème est la profondeur de la division du pays".

Le Monde | 24.05.10 | Envoyé spécial, Bangkok
Paul M. Handley est l'auteur d'une biographie sur le roi de Thaïlande, Bhumibol Adulyadej, bannie au royaume de Siam, The King Never Smiles : a Biography of Thailand's Bhumibol Adulyadej (Yale University Press). Aujourd'hui basé à Ryad où il est journaliste pour l'AFP, il décrypte la crise politique thaïlandaise en regard du rôle ambigu du palais royal dans la vie politique tout au long du règne du roi de Thaïlande. Entretien.

Le roi de Thaïlande est vénéré, mais il a largement usé de son influence en politique durant son règne, à la fois sous la dictature militaire et en démocratie. La crise politique actuelle n'est-elle pas aussi celle de ce système de gouvernement ambigu ?
Ce n'est pas la monarchie qui gouverne en Thaïlande – elle ne dirige pas activement le pays. Mais avec leurs alliés militaires, le roi et l'institution royale se réservent un droit ultime de décision. Ils l'invoquent à chaque fois qu'ils perçoivent une menace contre leurs intérêts et leur autorité. Le roi et quelques-uns des militaires estiment que cette autorité est utilisée dans l'intérêt du peuple et de la nation thaïlandaise. En réalité, pour tout un groupe de gens, et surtout la majeure partie des dirigeants militaires, c'est un moyen d'abuser du pouvoir dont ils disposent, à des fins personnelles.
Durant le règne du roi Bhumibol, à chaque fois que le palais et ses alliés militaires ont senti leur autorité ultime menacée par une personne ou un mouvement, ils ont tout mis en œuvre pour éliminer cette menace, d'autant plus lorsqu'elle s'est avérée être un mouvement populaire mené par un leader élu. Ils n'ont jamais pris en considération la valeur ajoutée apportée au pays, quoi qu'aient pu proposer ces mouvements. Cette tendance a été une constante durant tout le règne de Bhumibol.
Pendant les années 1980, tout cela était justifié comme une lutte contre le communisme. Mais le maintien de ce postulat après la fin de la guerre froide a été de plus en plus difficile à justifier. Pourtant, ils ont insisté sur le maintien de l'autorité suprême et sur ce droit de veto général, même si ils n'avaient pas de responsabilité ou de capacité de direction au quotidien.

Quelle responsabilité a Thaksin Shinawatra (ex-premier ministre thaïlandais en exil) dans cette crise ?
L'alliance Palais-militaires mise en place depuis 1990 a clairement été incapable de mener à bien la modernisation de la Thaïlande. Cependant, ils ont conservé leurs positions. Ils étaient très nerveux lorsque Thaksin Shinawatra est devenu premier ministre, parce qu'il avait un très fort soutien populaire, en particulier des populations rurales et des couches inférieures de la classe moyenne, les laissés-pour-compte du boom économique de la Thaïlande.
Lorsque la popularité de Thaksin a augmenté, et qu'il a essayé d'institutionnaliser son propre pouvoir (en plaçant ses propres hommes au sein de la police et de l'armée), l'alliance Palais-militaires a de nouveau invoqué ce droit de veto auquel elle a si souvent eu recours, en soutenant un soulèvement contre Thaksin, puis en essayant d'utiliser la justice pour le forcer à partir, et jusqu'au coup d'Etat de 2006.
Thaksin fut un premier ministre très corrompu, il a ouvertement abusé de son pouvoir, mais ce fut aussi le dirigeant élu le plus populaire de l'histoire thaïlandaise. Et de nouveau, une grande partie de la population a vu en lui la personne qui a le plus amélioré leurs conditions de vie être écartée du pouvoir.
Les deux premiers ministres suivants, élus au Parlement par le parti de Thaksin, ont également été contraints de démissionner, jusqu'à ce que finalement l'alliance Palais-militaires ait été en mesure de désigner leur partisan, Abhisit Vejjajiva.

A Bangkok, il y avait une forte haine envers Thaksin et les chemises rouges dans la classe moyenne et supérieure, car il n'était pas leur homme, et à juste titre, nombreux sont ceux qui se sentaient menacés par sa popularité. Néanmoins, il était populaire et il a été enlevé à ses partisans. Et les partisans de Thaksin ne voient pas Abhisit comme quelqu'un qui a leurs intérêts et leurs besoins à l'esprit. Ils se sentent dépossédés, et ils connaissent maintenant clairement les coupables : le palais et ses alliés militaires.

...

Suite de l'article >>

Propos recueillis par Brice Pedroletti
Traduit de l'anglais par Marine Campagne.

Philippines: Pre-election Tensions in Central Mindanao.

International Crisis Group | Asia Briefing Nº103 | Jakarta/Brussels | 4 May 2010

--

        As the Philippine election on 10 May 2010 draws nearer, voters in central Mindanao are focused on the political fallout from the “Maguindanao massacre”; clan politics; the new automated election system; and whether any agree­ment between the Philippines gov­ernment and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) is possible before President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo leaves office on 30 June.
Voters will choose a new president and vice president, members of the national Congress, and some 17,000 local executive and legislative positions. The biggest question in central Mindanao, however, is how much the power of the Ampatuan clan has been weakened by the arrests of its senior members for suspected involvement in the massacre. Fear that lawyers for the patriarch, Andal Ampatuan Sr, will somehow find a way to obtain the release of their client remain palpable in and around Maguindanao province. As pre-trial legal proceedings drag on, there is strong evidence of the family’s ability to bribe and intimidate witnesses, and the worry about Andal Sr’s eventual release is not without basis, especially given the controversial decision by the Department of Justice in mid-April to drop charges against two members of the clan.
Even if the political hold of the clan has been broken, at least temporarily, by the arrests, and new opportunities have opened up for its political rivals, the dominance of clans in Maguindanao politics remains unaffected. The Ampatuans’ opponents may give warlordism a gentler face, but political change would consist of substituting one family for another, not of any fundamental alteration of the system.
Sources of conflict remain high. If the 2009 massacre did not have its roots in a blood feud (rido) between clans, it may have created one going forward between the families of the killers and their victims. The arrests of the Ampatuans have also emboldened some to pursue rido-related revenge on members of the family’s private army. The likelihood of violence is so great that the military has placed Maguindanao on highest alert through the elections.
And in the midst of it all, pressure to produce an interim agreement between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Arroyo government remains high. The government is desperate for a pact so that Arroyo can leave office on a high note; the MILF will not be forced into an agreement for agreement’s sake. Some local political candidates have seized on the possibility of a pact to deliberately fan Christian concerns that they are about to be rushed into an agreement they do not want and say they have had no opportunity to discuss.
If no substantive agree­ment is reached before Arroyo leaves office, responsibility for con­tinuing the negotiations will fall to her successor, and it is open to question whether any of the top contenders has the interest or political will to push forward with peace. Failure of a new president to engage could undermine the relatively moderate MILF negotiating team, opening the possibility that a younger, more militant splinter group could emerge.
--